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Who Protests in Greece? Mass Opposition to
Austerity
WOLFGANG RU¨DIG AND GEORGIOS KARYOTIS*
The widespread opposition to unprecedented austerity measures in Greece provides a unique
opportunity to study the causes of mass protest. This article reports the results of a survey of the adult
population in which two-thirds of the respondents supported protest and 29 per cent reported actual
involvement in strikes and/or demonstrations during 2010. Relative deprivation is a significant
predictor of potential protest, but does not play any role in terms of who takes part in strikes or
demonstrations. Previous protest participation emerges as a key predictor of actual protest. This
study seeks to place these results within a comparative context, contrasting Greece with other
countries facing similar challenges, and discusses the implications for the future of austerity politics.
From the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street movement, the Chilean student
demonstrations and the environmental protests of German Wutbu¨rger (angry citizens), a
new wave of protest is spreading around the world that might even be compared with that
of 1848 or 1968.1 One of the key contributors to this wave of protest is opposition to the
austerity policies adopted by several governments following the economic and financial
crises of the late 2000s. Given the broad array of issues addressed and political contexts
in which the protests take place, the question arises of how similar these new protest
movements really are. To what extent do these movements constitute a new protest
culture?2 The rise of austerity movements in particular appears to challenge the dominant
frame for the analysis of protest behaviour in Western Europe, which has focused on the
rise of ‘new politics’ and associated ‘new social movements’ addressing issues such as the
environment and peace. The main protagonists of these movements were generations
socialized in affluent post-war economies that hold ‘post-materialist values’.3 Anti-austerity
protests, on the other hand, focus on ‘material’ issues, such as cuts in public expenditure,
unemployment and inequality. Such protests could thus be expected to fit what Harold R.
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1 Stiglitz 2012; Mason 2012; Castells 2012; Kraushaar 2012.
2 Hartleb 2011.
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Kerbo termed ‘movements of crisis’ in contrast to ‘movements of affluence’.4 A key question
for understanding the recent mobilization against austerity is whether it represents a further
manifestation of the impact of ‘new social movements’ or a different protest culture that is
more akin to ‘old’ rather than ‘new’ politics.
While anti-austerity protest can be found in many countries, the sovereign debt crisis in
the eurozone that accelerated in 2010 provides a specific focus. The country at the
forefront of this development is Greece. To prevent a disorderly default on its debt, in
May 2010 the socialist PASOK government negotiated the largest loan ever received by a
single country (h110 billion) in return for enacting a draconian structural adjustment
programme. Greece was of course not the only country to experience acute economic
problems and be forced to adopt austerity policies. Spain, Italy and Portugal in Southern
Europe, as well as Ireland and the UK, among others, were also in similar positions.
However, anti-austerity protest appears to have been, at least thus far, much more intense
in Greece than elsewhere, including in comparison to countries that have also had to
resort to international financial rescues.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to understand the determinants of anti-
austerity protest in Greece in a comparative context, analysing the socio-political profile
of protesters and the mechanisms through which they were mobilized in 2010. Despite the
prevalence of strikes and demonstrations in Greece’s political landscape, there is little
empirical research on the individual and collective drivers of participation in protest
activity.5 Is there something specific about Greece that explains its higher level of
mobilization compared to other countries, or is it a precursor of things to come elsewhere?
Secondly, this article maps the characteristics of the anti-austerity movement by engaging
with broader theoretical debates about the determinants of participation in protest.
In particular, given the centrality of economic hardship in the austerity debate, to what
extent can the theory of ‘relative deprivation’ return to the fore of political behaviour
when tested against other classic theories, such as resource mobilization and rational
choice approaches?
Crucially, the huge size and frequency of demonstrations and general strikes in Greece
offer a unique opportunity to study protest behaviour by analysing individual-level data
collected in a general population survey. We conducted a survey of the Greek adult
population in December 2010. Of 1,014 people interviewed, 302 (29 per cent) stated that
they had engaged in protest, a sizeable minority of the population. Unlike surveys of
demonstrators, this survey gives us data on both participants and non-participants
of a particular type of political protest. Furthermore, unlike many previous studies of
political protest, this survey assesses the engagement of individuals in a specific protest
movement and actions that preceded the data gathering process by days, weeks or
(at most) months. This will allow us to first scrutinize opposition to austerity policies and
support for protest action before exploring who, out of this pool of potential protesters,
ended up taking part in actual protests.
The article argues that to explain the phenomenon of anti-austerity protest, we need to
take adequate account of both the aggregate context at the national level and its dynamic
4 Kerbo 1982.
5 Typically, studies of protest behaviour in Greece are qualitative. For example, see Economides and
Monastiriotis 2009; Pechtelidis 2011. One interesting exception is a study reporting the results of various
laboratory experiments conducted in the context of the 2008 riots. See Hugh-Jones, Katsanidou, and
Richter 2011.
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interrelationship with the drivers of mobilization at the individual level. It thus begins
with a brief overview of Greek protest culture, which informs the subsequent theorization
about the individual drivers of protest and helps us generate relevant hypotheses. The
collection of data is then discussed, followed by a discussion of the main findings and their
theoretical and empirical implications for austerity politics. In the overall analysis, we will
examine to what extent the economic circumstances of the austerity crisis (or the political
context of a highly developed protest culture) are the primary drivers of anti-austerity
protest in Greece. We find that relative deprivation plays an important role in defining
protest potential, but socialization into taking particular forms of political action through
prior protest involvement is an essential component of explaining who actually protests.
PROTEST IN GREECE: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
According to Charles Tilly, protest behaviour cannot be seen as simply reactive or
spontaneous – or be fully understood by looking only at individual-level influences.
Protest repertoires, Tilly argues, ‘are learned cultural creations’6 that carry a different
meaning, and whose parameters are defined by a shared culture that structures
relationships of power and resistance. A range of related concepts has been employed
to analyse the nation-specific political context of protest behaviour, including mentalities,
‘political cultures’ and ‘collective action frames’.7 These concepts highlight the fact that
the intensity and character of protest are historically contingent and dependent on a
specific socio-political context, which may explain why there is greater protest
mobilization in some countries than in others. To understand the drivers of anti-
austerity protest in Greece, we thus have to first look at the unique national setting in
which the movement developed.
Contentious politics evolved in Greece as a result of historical struggles, which
gradually stretched the boundaries of the permissible expression of social demands
through protest in a way that undermined state authority and glorified resistance to
government policies.8 A critical juncture in the development of this protest culture in
modern Greek history can be traced to the student opposition against the military junta
that ruled between 1967 and 1974. The uprising in the Polytechnic on 17 November 1973
is recognized in popular discourse as causing the regime’s collapse and the return to
democracy a year later. The ensuing romanticized vision of collective action, amplified by
a widespread suspicion of any attempts by the authorities to impose stricter internal
security controls in a nation that had experienced excessive police brutality during the
junta’s rule, provides fertile ground for new movements to elicit sympathy and obtain
legitimacy.9 Consequently, various forms of protest, such as the widespread practice of
school occupations and the partisan activism of university student politics, have been
institutionalized and are widely reproduced in social and political life.10
The groups that led the resistance against the military junta were at the left of the
spectrum. Despite their small size, many extra-parliamentary leftist groups, along with
various anarchist groups, continued their ‘struggles’ after the transition to democracy,
6 Tilly 1995, 26.
7 Tarrow 1992.
8 Andronikidou and Kovras 2012.
9 Karyotis 2007.
10 Lyrintzis 2011; Andronikidou and Kovras 2012.
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playing leading roles in almost all the social movements that have emerged since.11 The
socialist PASOK government in the 1980s was, to an extent, able to contain some of the
most militant parts of these movements ‘by promising to change society from above’12
and forming close relationships with the trade unions that organize the majority of
protests.13 Meanwhile, parliamentary parties of the Left, notably the Greek Communist
Party (KKE) and later the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza), actively encouraged
collective action but were unable to capitalize (in electoral terms) on the left-wing
orientation of protests prior to the May/June elections of 2012.14 Successive working-class
struggles in Greece are thus, according to Lountos, not a manifestation of the organized
Left’s unifying role but rather the product of the sustained activity of ‘a layer of militant
and radical minorities’, the influence of which is disproportionately high in the specific
context and protest culture within which they operate.15
A recent example identified in the literature as a manifestation of the influence of Greek
protest culture were the violent demonstrations and riots that followed the shooting of a
fifteen-year old student by a police officer in December 2008.16 It is difficult, however, to
establish a link between such an alleged ‘protest culture’ and protest events without data
on the protesters. Although the historical narrative above suggests that there is such a
protest culture in Greece, we need cross-national data to assess whether this leads to a
greater propensity for protest compared to other countries facing similar conditions.
Reliable data on past protest behaviour is difficult to come by. One popular approach
among social movement scholars has been using media reports to analyse protest events.
Comparing the yearly mean number of protest events between 1990 and 199517 using the
Protest and Coercion dataset,18 Greece (with 224.17 events) came way behind countries such
as France, Spain and Italy. However, if population size is taken into account,19 Greece (with
21.3 protest events per million inhabitants) ranks at the same level as France (21.7) and above
Spain (14.0), Portugal (6.9) and Italy (6.0), although well behind Ireland (75.1).
Comparative data from population surveys may provide some clues about the number
of people involved in protest activities. The European Values Survey has asked since
1981 about participation in a range of political actions, including ‘attending lawful
demonstrations’, but Greece was only involved in two studies, in 1999 and 2008.20 In 1999, a
staggering 48 per cent of Greek respondents claimed to have taken part in a demonstration at
11 Kassimeris 2005; Kanellopoulos 2012.
12 Lountos 2012, 187.
13 Mavrogordatos 1997.
14 Left-wing parties did not until 2012 pose any direct challenge against the two major parties, PASOK
and New Democracy, which took turns to run the country after 1974. Cf. Lyrintzis 2011, for a recent
assessment.
15 Lountos 2012, 187.
16 Lountos 2012.
17 Nam 2007.
18 European Protest and Coercion Data, compiled by Ron Francisco http://web.ku.edu/,ronfran//,
accessed 10 March 2012.
19 Own calculations based on Nam’s (2007) data and 1992 population size data obtained from the US
census website, http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php,
accessed 10 March 2012.
20 Own analysis of European Values Study data, 1981–2008; design weight applied. European Values
Study Longitudinal Data File 1981–2008 (Cologne, Germany: GESIS Data Archive, 2011) [ZA4804 Data
file Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11005]. For more information on the EVS study, see http://
www.europeanvaluesstudy.org, accessed 26 March 2012.
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some point in their lives; by 2008, this figure had fallen to 24 per cent. The 1999 figure was the
highest figure ever recorded in the European Values Survey – France came closest with 46 per
cent in 2008 – and could thus be seen as evidence of an exceptionally strong protest culture.
However, the 1999 figure appears to reflect the specific context of the time. Apart from a high
level of protest against the military dictatorship in the 1970s, the 1990s also saw mass protest on
a huge scale, in particular the movement on the Macedonian issue, about which protest was
actively supported by all political forces.21 The 2008 figure of 24 per cent, immediately
preceding the 2010 protests, brought Greece back in line with other Southern European
countries that have always displayed a rather high preponderance for protest behaviour, in
particular Italy (2009: 38 per cent) and Spain (2008: 39 per cent).
More recent figures have been collected by the European Social Survey since 2002 with
a question on participation in ‘lawful’ demonstrations over the last twelve months.22
The results for Greece and a host of other countries affected by the austerity crisis are
plotted in Figure 1. These data confirm the slowing down of protest in Greece – as far as
demonstrations were concerned – in the 2000s, a period of economic growth and
prosperity during which Spain and Italy had a higher share of protesters.
On the other hand, Greece clearly stands out from others in the number of general strikes,
which are largely absent from the repertoire of trade union actions in Northern Europe
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Fig. 1. Participation in ‘lawful’ demonstrations in the last twelve months, 2002–2011
Source: European Social Survey, Waves 1–5, 2002–2011, http://ess.nsd.uib.no, [accessed 2 April 2012];
own analysis restricted to citizens of the country aged eighteen or over, design weight applied. Question
wording: ‘During the last twelve months, have you done any of the following: – taken part in a lawful
public demonstration? (Yes/No)’.
21 Two mass demonstrations took place in 1992, among others, in Athens and in Thessaloniki, with the
participation of 1.3 and 1 million people respectively; see Danforth 1995, and European Protest and
Coercion Data, ‘Greece 1980–1995’ file.
22 European Social Survey Rounds 1–5, Data file editions 6.2 (Round 1), 3.2 (Round 2), 3.3 (Round 4),
4.0 (Round 5), 2.0 (Round 6) (Oslo: Norwegian Social Science Data Services – Data Archive and
Distributor of European Social Survey Data, 2002–2010).
Mass Opposition to Austerity in Greece 491
(including Ireland and the UK) and are uncommon in Southern Europe, but had become a
regular feature of Greek life well before the austerity protests. Back in the early 1990s, there
were multiple general strikes in protest of welfare retrenchment and cuts.23 Over the last ten
years, there has been at least one general strike called in Greece per year (except in 2003),
peaking at seven in both 2010 and 2011 (see Table 1). The role of trade unions is crucial, as
they are responsible for calling the strikes. Although figures on trade union membership do
not suggest that Greece is a particularly radicalized society,24 case studies have shown that
unions have maintained a high degree of organizational cohesion and activism.25
In terms of the economic outlook for Greece, the comparative data for 2010–2011 are
fairly devastating; on all macroeconomic indicators such as gross national product,
unemployment and gross national debt, Greece was doing worse than other countries hit
by the sovereign debt crisis.26 This has severely affected individual citizens who are most
pessimistic in their evaluations of their economic circumstances, a sentiment captured in
Eurobarometer surveys, plotted in Figure 2. Since early 2010, Greeks have perceived
themselves as facing the toughest economic conditions, with more than 60 per cent
considering their economic positions to be ‘rather bad’ or ‘very bad’.
The overall analysis of patterns of activity suggests that Greece has some similarities
with Spain and Italy, with which it also shares an authoritarian past, and stark differences
with others, including Ireland, Portugal and the UK. The combination of media reports
and population survey data show that Greece has a group of activists that generates
a lot of protest events that can occasionally mobilize a sizeable number of people.
Furthermore, while the socio-political context illustrates the presence of a left-leaning
protest culture in Greece, not all of the major past protest events are linked to radical left-
wing politics; the number of people mobilized greatly exceeds the electoral support that
radical left parties received (before 2012). This historical overview implies that there is a
large reservoir of people who have been engaged in protest before and who any protest
mobilization in Greece may be able to draw on. Therefore, in our analysis of the
individual-level determinants of participation in the anti-austerity movement, we will
TABLE 1 Number of General Strikes in South European Countries, 2002–2011
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Greece 1 0 1 3 2 1 1 1 7 7
Italy 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 2
Portugal 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Spain 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Sources: Hamann, Johnston, and Kelly 2013; European Industrial Relations Observatory
(EIRO), http://eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/index.htm [accessed 5 April 2012]; authors’ database.
23 Cf. European Protest and Coercion Data.
24 According to OECD statistics, trade union density in 2008 was 24 per cent in Greece, compared to
32.2 in Ireland, 33.4 in Italy, 20.5 in Portugal, 15 per cent in Spain and 27.1 in the UK; http://
stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode5UN_DEN, accessed 11 April 2012.
25 Kretsos 2011.
26 With 5 per cent negative growth and its national debt estimated to over 160 per cent of its GDP in
2011, Greece topped all indicators of deprivation, with the exception of unemployment, where it was
second to Spain’s 20 per cent rate. See comparative data in IMF World Economic Outlook, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm, accessed 5 April 2012.
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need to pay specific attention to these contextual factors, particularly previous protest
participation, which may play an important role in accounting for involvement in protest
activities in 2010. Another contextual factor that sets Greece apart is the depth of the
economic hardship experienced. This factor reinforces the idea that any attempt to
explain protest participation should consider the possible impact of factors linked to
economic deprivation.
THEORIZING INDIVIDUAL DRIVERS OF PROTEST
Many different theories have been discussed to explain who becomes involved in protest
behaviour; some have been more or less fashionable at different times. Considering the
widespread detrimental impact of the crisis on individuals’ circumstances, as well as the
suddenness with which grievances were imposed,27 the first group of factors that we
should investigate focuses on the idea of protest as a response to injustice and deprivation.
This is one of the oldest theories of protest and revolution, and has been an important
element of Marxist debate since the nineteenth century. In the 1940s and 1950s, empirical
analysis of social behaviour generated a major refinement of the theory. A range of
studies suggested that the ‘absolute’ level of deprivation, such as poverty and inequality,
was not linked to protest behaviour; other factors also needed to be present. This shift in
thinking led to the theory of ‘relative deprivation’, which focused on a range of other
conditions necessary to turn the stimulus of ‘absolute’ deprivation into active protest. The
most important aspect of Ted Robert Gurr’s influential model, which included numerous
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2008
%
Greece
Ireland 
Italy
Portugal
Spain
UK
2009 2010 2011
Fig. 2. Current financial situation of household ‘rather bad’ or ‘very bad’, 2008–2011
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 70–76, 2008–2011, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch.
en.htm [accessed 2 April 2012]. Question wording: ‘How would you judge the current situation in each of the
following? – The financial situation of your household – Very good, rather good, rather bad, very bad’.
27 On the concept of ‘suddenly imposed grievances’ providing a spur to the recruitment of protest
participants, cf. Walsh 1981.
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other intervening variables, was that the ‘deprivation’ had to be perceived relative to what
an individual feels entitled to.28
The theory of relative deprivation, however, fell out of fashion in the 1970s, in large
part due to its apparent inability to explain individual involvement in – as well as the
size of – protest events such as the black ghetto riots in US cities in the 1960s.29 There
appeared to be a widespread consensus in the academic community analysing social
movements by the 1980s and 1990s to reject relative deprivation theory and turn to rival
explanations;30 only social psychologists continued to express support for it.31 More
recently, relative deprivation models have been used to analyse various forms of political
behaviour – such as election turnout,32 protest potential33 and past protest behaviour34 –
which has generally confirmed the theory’s lack of explanatory value.
The anti-austerity movement in Greece, which appears to be chiefly motivated by a
‘deprivation’-type stimulus, offers an ideal setting in which to test the theory. While there
are no detailed data on how each individual is affected by the measures, our survey
captures the level of deprivation by asking respondents a number of questions about their
past and future economic situation. These data allow us to measure the perception of the
size of the economic deprivation, which could be seen as an approximation of the ‘felt’
deprivation that is expected to be a key predictor of protest.
Apart from the actual experience of economic hardship, an essential element of
deprivation theory involves aspects of ‘fairness’ and ‘blame attribution’. Conditions will
not be perceived as ‘depriving’ unless individuals perceive that they are treated unfairly
and are not themselves to blame for their situation. Within the Greek political discourse
on austerity, issues of fairness and blame play an important role. A broad range of actors
such as financial institutions (both international and domestic) and other foreign bodies
such as the EU, Germany or ‘globalization’ in general, have been held accountable. While
all sides appear to share some elements of blame attribution, the main dividing lines
between proponents and opponents concern questions about the effectiveness and fairness
of the proposed policies. We would thus expect a perception of unfairness to play an
important role in the decision to protest. Furthermore, relative deprivation theory would
suggest that those adopting an ‘internal’ blame attribution, for example unemployed
people blaming themselves for their inability to find a job, are less likely to protest.35 A
test of relative deprivation theory would thus involve a range of variables that measures
economic experiences and perceptions, as well as considerations of unfairness and blame.
Relative deprivation theory was replaced as the dominant theory of protest in the 1960s
and 1970s by approaches that focus on individuals’ resources. To test whether relative
deprivation makes an independent contribution to explaining protest in the context of
Greece’s extreme austerity situation in 2010, the first group of variables that we need to
control for is defined by ‘resources’. The earliest major empirical study that covered the
entire range of political actions taken in the United States used resource-based explanations
28 Gurr 1970.
29 Brush 1996.
30 Gurney and Tierney 1982.
31 Crosby 1976; Walker and Smith 2002.
32 Clarke et al. 2004, 237–40.
33 Sanders et al. 2004.
34 Dalton, van Sickle, and Weldon 2009.
35 Cf. Walker, Wong, and Kretzschmar 2002.
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of behaviour.36 People participated in politics who had the resources to do so; this placed
variables such as education, occupation and income – the ‘socio-economic status’ (SES) –
at the centre of the analysis.
How can we adapt ‘resource’-based theories of social protest to the Greek situation?
We propose to concentrate on two types of resource-based variables: biographical
availability and social networks. We can easily test a basic model of political participation
with reference to variables of individuals’ ‘biographical availability’,37 such as age,
gender, marital status, caring for children and education. Protest behaviour has in the
past mainly involved younger people; lack of obligations linked to family and occupation
could make young cohorts (under thirty) more likely to be involved. Engaging in protests
such as demonstrations involves a degree of physical activity that may make it less likely
for older cohorts, above fifty or sixty, to take part. Education has been found to be
strongly associated with both conventional and unconventional political behaviour. In the
context of protest associated with ‘new politics’, education is linked to the concept of
‘cognitive mobilization’. Inglehart conceived this concept as the basis of a ‘newer elite-
challenging mode of participation’, in contrast to old types that relied on political parties
and trade unions.38
However, there are questions about the links between ‘biographical availability’ at
different stages of mobilization and different kinds of protest. One of the few studies
comparing protest potential and actual protest found biographical availability to be an
important predictor of potential (but not actual) protest.39 A study of participation in a
movement of homeless people, a protest strongly associated with issues of economic
deprivation, showed that those with less biographical availability were more likely to
participate.40 This finding may suggest that these variables are less likely to apply to protest
that is mainly defined as a ‘movement of crisis’ in which economic survival is at stake.
In the 1990s, the SES approach was supplemented to create an extended model known
as ‘civic voluntarism’,41 which included other resource aspects, such as time, as well as a
social link: people participated in politics if they had the resources – and the opportunity –
to take part. People who are integrated into social networks that generated requests to
take part in particular actions could be seen as having more opportunities, and were thus
more likely to participate. Involvement of individuals in social networks has also been
shown to be particularly important in turning ‘potential’ into ‘actual’ participants.42 In
line with the literature,43 we would expect participation in social networks – such as
political parties, trade unions and voluntary organizations – to be linked to protest
behaviour. Union membership and full-time employment, especially in the public sector,
would be particularly likely to increase the likelihood of strike participation, as they
would expose individuals to greater mobilization attempts. In general, and contrary to
expectations based on considerations of time availability, past surveys have shown that
those in full-time employment are generally more likely to be involved in protest.44
36 Verba and Nie 1972.
37 McAdam 1986, 70; Schussman and Soule 2005, 1085.
38 Inglehart 1997, 169.
39 Beyerlein and Hipp 2006.
40 Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009.
41 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995.
42 McAdam 1986; Klandermans and Oegema 1987.
43 Quintelier 2008; Somma 2010.
44 Verhulst and Walgrave 2009, 460.
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An additional important variable that can be termed a ‘resource’ is previous involvement in
strikes and demonstrations. People socialized into a specific form of collective action could be
expected to be more likely to engage in such behaviour in the future, although the probability
of remobilization is likely to be affected by both ‘biographical availability’45 and ‘social
network’ involvement. Previous protesters who were mobilized through informal recruitment
networks, such as friends and family links, may more easily participate in renewed protest
activity.46 In the absence of panel data stretching back to specific previous experiences of
protest, however, we have to be careful about the exact nature and direction of causal links.
Protest involvement may promote a process of politicization that makes protesters more
likely to be involved in trade unions, voluntary organizations and political parties, thus
providing a network connection. Protest involvement could also be conducive to adopting a
left-wing ideology and attachment to left-wing politics. Finally, those with protest experience
may have a different perception of the costs and benefits of protest. In order to test the
independent effects of such variables, we must also include predictors of ideological position
and rational choice criteria.
Greece has a bipolar political system that is dominated by the left-right divide.
We could expect left-wing ideology to be an important predictor of protest participation.
The parties of the Far Left, such as KKE, Syriza and DIMAR, have been particularly
active in the anti-austerity movement, dominating much of its public relations and trying
to promote a left-wing, anti-capitalist discourse of austerity politics. A second variable
could measure an individual’s past attachment to such parties, such as voting for Far Left
parties in the 2009 general elections. If the anti-austerity protest is essentially a movement
of the radical left, then past support for left-wing parties should be an important predictor
of protest participation.
A key question is to what extent the anti-austerity movement reflects elements of ‘new’
or ‘old’ politics. The importance of ‘post-material value change’ for participation in a
wide variety of protests has been well documented, even when demands are focused on
material concerns. For instance, movements such as the Spanish indignados mainly
involve young and highly educated people not connected with ‘old’ politics mobilization
contexts like trade unions and political parties,47 who challenge the entire basis of
establishment politics and promote demands for more participation and democratization.48
In addition to other variables, we thus also need to test whether holding post-materialist
values is an independent predictor of protest involvement.
Finally, we should also consider the theory of rational choice, which is arguably the
dominant approach in the analysis of political behaviour. A rational choice approach would
predict that only people who perceive the benefits of taking part in protest to be greater than
the costs are likely to participate. While some rational choice models of protest focus centrally
on the measurement of general notions of political efficacy,49 we introduce measurements
45 For a detailed assessment of influence of protest participation on subsequent political behaviour in
the US context, cf. Corrigall-Brown 2012.
46 The direct examination of such informal recruitment networks is beyond the scope of our article.
Anti-austerity protests in 2010 involved a large number of individual protest events, and thus it was
considered impractical to ask questions relating to specific incidents of protest participation, such as
‘targeting’ efforts by family, friends or trade unions, which might apply to some events but not others.
47 Cf. Anduiza, Cristancho, and Sabucedo 2012.
48 Rosenmann 2012.
49 We initially followed the example of Sanders et al. (2004), focusing centrally on measurements of
‘political efficacy’. However, these variables were not associated with actual protest participation in
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of the perceived costs and benefits of the specific type of anti-austerity protest in which
respondents might consider being involved. The cost element is measured by a question about
the risk of being injured or arrested when taking part in a demonstration. The benefits
(probability of success) are measured by two items that evaluate the likely effectiveness of
taking part in strikes and joining demonstrations. Even with such a basic design, the main
problem with applying a rational choice approach in our case is the limitation of our data to
one time point. This means that there has to be a question mark about the direction of causal
sequences. Still, the inclusion of rational choice variables remains important as controls for
assessing the impact of relative deprivation and other predictors of protest.
We thus have established four general areas from which relevant hypotheses about
protest behaviour can be drawn and tested: relative deprivation, resources (biographical
availability and social networks), political ideology and rational choice. Before we discuss
our findings, we need to describe our data collection and look more closely at some key
methodological challenges.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Unusually in the study of involvement in a specific protest movement, our analysis is
based on a survey of the general population. This approach is rare in the literature, mainly
because the share of the population involved in individual protest events is usually too
small to generate enough cases. In the case of anti-austerity protest in Greece, this is
different. In addition to seven general strikes during 2010, numerous protest marches
were also organized. According to police figures, a total of 7,123 demonstrations took
place in Greece during 2010, the vast majority of which we can assume was concerned
with anti-austerity protest (see Table 2). Given an average figure of just over 200 protest
events per year in the early 1990s, which were seen as a time of high protest incidence, this
information about more than 7,000 events in just one year, with hundreds of marches
every month, reveals a staggering degree of political mobilization.
There are few precedents for this kind of approach. As far as we are aware, the only
previous attempt to use a general survey that is representative of the entire population at
the national level to analyse involvement in a specific set of political demonstrations was
carried out by Philip Converse and Roy Pierce in France in the late 1960s.50 They
conducted a general public attitude survey after the protest events of May 1968, finding
that about 20 per cent of their sample was involved in strikes and 8 per cent had taken
part in demonstrations. Two more studies used surveys to measure actual participation in
widespread protest action in the East German town of Leipzig51 and among the Latino
population of the United States,52 but these targeted a specific section of the population
(F’note continued)
Greece at all. For this reason, we did not include them in our model. Also Pierce and Converse (1989) reported
in their study of 1968 protest that a general sense of political efficacy was not a predictor of protest.
50 Converse and Pierce 1986.
51 Mass demonstrations took place in the autumn of 1989 that played a crucial role in bringing down
the Communist regime. Karl-Dieter Opp and his collaborators carried out a survey of a sample of the
town’s population one year later in 1990, finding that 39 per cent claimed to have demonstrated. See Opp
and Gern 1993; Opp, Voss, and Gern 1996.
52 Between 3.5 and 5.1 million Latinos mobilized in protest marches against changes to the status of
immigrants in the spring of 2006, with 10 per cent of those surveyed indicating that they had taken part in
the demonstrations. See Barreto et al. 2009.
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defined on geographical or ethnic grounds. Obviously, the Greek context is radically
different from the politics of 1968 in France, the Communist regime in East Germany in
1989 and US immigration politics in 2006. In all these cases, however, the very widespread
nature of protest action allows an analysis of who was (and was not) involved in a specific
range of actions, and thus some aspects of the previous studies were useful in designing
our study of protest in 2010.
Our approach has several advantages over more common ways of analysing protest
participation. Previous empirical research on protest behaviour can be grouped into three
main categories. The first approach is the analysis of protest ‘potential’. Pioneered in the
1970s, such studies analysed protest on the basis of respondents’ expressed likelihood of
engaging in protest activity at some point in the future.53 While such an approach has had
a wide resonance, in particular in the study of the ‘new social movements’ and related
protest events, with continued popularity in other general attitude surveys,54 its main
weakness was always its focus on ‘potential’ or ‘probable’ protest behaviour.55 It thus
remains uncertain to what extent inferences about actual protest behaviour can be drawn
on the basis of survey questions about what type of behaviour an individual might or
might not engage in at some unspecified time in the future on an unspecified issue of
political controversy. Our data, on the other hand, allow us not only to analyse the
determinants of ‘potential’ protest but also to scrutinize the factors responsible for
turning ‘potential’ into ‘actual’ protest.
A second group of studies concentrates on the analysis of past protest behaviour. Major
surveys such as the World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Programme, the
European Values Study and the European Social Survey have included questions about
past protest behaviour, such as attending demonstrations, either with no time restrictions
or with reference to the previous twelve months. A number of analyses has been published
TABLE 2 Number of Demonstrations in Greece in 2010
Number
Month Nationwide Athens
January 580 250
February 551 257
March 603 316
April 544 364
May 856 425
June 791 513
July 552 343
August 189 150
September 694 461
October 739 611
November 695 492
December 329 86
Total 7,123 4,268
Source: Hellenic Police Statistics, personal communication with press
office, 2 April 2012.
53 Barnes and Kaase et al. 1979.
54 Sanders et al. 2004; Heath 2008; Jenkins, Wallace, and Fullerton 2008.
55 Rootes 1981. For strike action see Buttigieg, Deery, and Iverson 2008.
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on the basis of such large international datasets.56 One weakness of this approach is its
lack of specificity. Respondents are asked about participation in particular types of
political behaviour, such as ‘attending a lawful demonstration’, without any reference to
the type of issue or movement that this activity was related to. Thus a broad range of
phenomena, including left-wing, environmental, anti-tax, law and order and other right-
wing protest issues are mingled together. In our analysis of a specific protest movement,
we can also examine what accounts for past protest involvement and assess the role of
such an experience for participation in a contemporary movement.
A third group seeks to sidestep the limitations of general attitude surveys by surveying
those engaged in protest directly, an approach that has become the dominant method of
sociologists of social movements to analyse movement participation. After some pioneering
empirical work in Belgium,57 major comparative research projects involving surveys of
demonstrators were conducted in the 2000s.58 Such studies allow for excellent assessments
of the background of demonstrators engaged in specific actions and on different types of
movements, but are restrained by their inevitable lack of data on non-demonstrators.59 This
makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to analyse the recruitment process and answer the
question of what determines whether an individual protests or not.
In order to take advantage of the unique opportunity to study protest behaviour
presented by the events in Greece, a telephone survey was conducted by Kappa Research,
Athens, in early December 2010. The selection method used was a stratified quota sample.
Quotas were defined according to census data for gender and age. Telephone codes were
first selected corresponding to each region in relation to its population size. The remaining
dialing digits were generated randomly by computer software. The suitability of each
respondent was first queried in terms of minimum age (eighteen) and voting rights (Greek
citizen) before proceeding with each interview. Only one interview could be conducted per
household. This process generated a dataset with 1,014 valid responses that is representative
of the distribution of the Greek population in terms of geographical location, gender and age.
How do we analyse the determinants of anti-austerity protests and test our hypotheses?
Our study’s design is primarily inspired by the pioneering work of Bert Klandermans and
Dirk Oegema,60 who distinguished between a number of steps in the analysis of protest
involvement. In adapting this model to our data, we identify four steps that can help us
dissect the individual drivers for protest, while allowing the influence of contextual factors
to shine through: (1) motivation potential: agreement with/sympathy for the goals of the
protest; (2) protest potential: attitudes towards protest action; (3) protest opportunities:
perceived access to protest and (4) actual participation.
The first step is to concentrate on the explanation of opposition to the government’s
austerity policy. Without controlling for the degree of opposition, it will be impossible to
identify the factors that explain actual protest behaviour rather than the strength of
56 Cf. for example Schussman and Soule 2005; Dalton, Sickle, and Weldon 2009; Marien, Hooghe, and
Quintelier 2010.
57 Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001; Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005.
58 Walgrave and Rucht (2010); for later surveys of demonstrators, see Klandermans (2012) and other
articles published in that journal issue as well as the website: http://www.protestsurvey.eu, accessed
28 February 2012.
59 There are very few studies comparing actual strikers and non-strikers, see Snarr 1975; McClendon
and Klaas 1993; Dixon and Roscigno 2003.
60 This model is adapted from Klandermans and Oegema 1987, 524; cf. also van Stekelenburg and
Klandermans 2010, 190.
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attitudes on austerity. In response to the question: ‘To what extent do you support or
oppose the government’s austerity programme?’, 54 per cent expressed opposition to
the programme. The second step in our model concerns attitudes toward protest.
Some respondents may be opposed to the austerity programme but may not support the
idea that people should protest against it. Respondents were asked to react to the
statement ‘People should protest against the austerity measures’; 28 per cent strongly
agreed and 37 per cent agreed. A clear majority of the population was thus in favour of
protest. Of those opposed to the government’s policy of austerity, more than 80 per cent
supported protest.
The third step is to examine other obstacles that may prevent opponents of austerity
who are willing to protest from joining an actual protest. As a wide variety of protests and
strikes were organized during 2010, one might assume that everyone could have found a
protest to join. While this might be true in the larger cities, in particular in Athens where
more than half of all demonstrations (4,268) took place in 2010, it could not necessarily be
assumed to apply in the rural and island communities. Protest behaviour is collective
behaviour; that is, individuals are joining a strand of behaviour that involves many
others. The vast majority of people participating in protests is not involved in organizing
a protest, which poses a problem in that non-participation may simply reflect the fact that
no protest was organized in the respondent’s community. On the other hand, many
people travelled to attend protest events outside their communities.
We asked respondents whether they were aware of any protest activities in their local
community before inquiring about their own protest participation. This essentially
follows the approach by Converse and Pierce in France. Such a construction also allows
us to use this variable to measure the opportunity to protest. One-third of respondents
reported that no strikes had taken place in their community, and slightly more than one-
third, 37 per cent, reported that no demonstrations had been organized. About 57 per cent
of respondents lived in towns or communities in which both strikes and demonstrations
took place, and 26 per cent of respondents reported neither taking place. Given the
widespread nature of strikes and demonstrations in 2010, this lack of protests in certain
communities is rather higher than we expected. A closer look at the localities of
respondents reveals that there is a major gap in the number of protests between the major
cities, smaller towns and country villages. About 80 per cent of respondents residing in big
cities reported strikes and demonstrations. This drops to between 47 and 55 per cent in the
suburbs and small towns, and to 38 per cent in country villages. Thus there were
considerably fewer protest opportunities in rural areas. This echoes Converse and Pierce’s
finding that protest in 1968 was also predominantly an urban phenomenon.61
In order to develop an overall model of protest involvement that assesses the effect of
various individual-level variables, we also have to consider past protest involvement. As
suggested in our earlier discussion of the socio-political and historical contexts, past
involvement may indicate the influence of a particular protest culture, or it may simply mean
that participation barriers were reduced from the previous protest experience.62 When asked
about previous participation in strikes and demonstrations, eight out of ten anti-austerity
protesters in 2010 reported having taken part in either demonstrations or strikes, or both,
before. We thus have a closer look at the factors explaining both past and present protest,
61 Converse and Pierce 1986, 422–3.
62 Verhulst and Walgrave 2009.
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and can compare models with and without the previous protest involvement variable in order
to assess the relative effect of various possible predictors of protest.
About one-fifth of all respondents, 21 per cent, reported that they had taken part in
strike action. Nineteen per cent said that they had taken part in a demonstration in their
local community. We also asked whether respondents had taken part in demonstrations
‘outside’ their own town or community; 8 per cent of respondents said they had done so.
With some taking part in more than one form of protest, the total share of people taking
part in at least one form of protest was slightly less than one-third, 29 per cent. Our main
dependent variable is thus protest participation, which includes all forms of protest. As we
do expect some differences between participation in strikes and demonstrations, both
forms of protest are also analysed separately.
We begin by discussing opposition to the government’s austerity programme, support
for protest against the programme and the perception of opportunities to join the protest.
Analytically, we are particularly interested in analysing ‘potential protest’ that could be
the subject of mobilization efforts defined by opposition to the austerity programme,
combined with the belief that people should protest against it. The primary purpose of this is,
however, to define control variables for analysing actual protest participation. Accounting for
opposition to austerity, support for protest and the opportunity to protest, which factors
predict who is actually turning out to take part in strikes and demonstrations?
To develop an overall model of protest involvement that assesses the effect of various
individual-level variables, one factor that we should include and are particularly
interested in – following our discussion of Greek protest culture – is previous protest
involvement. We thus have a closer look at the factors that explain both past and present
protest activity, and compare models with and without the previous protest involvement
variable in order to assess the relative effect of various possible predictors of protest.
FINDINGS
The results of the first step in our analysis – seeking to explain opposition to austerity,
support for protest and perception of protest opportunities – are presented in Table 3.
The strength of opposition to the austerity programme is associated with relative
deprivation variables. Previous protest participation and other aspects of biographical
availability play no role. Opposition is particularly strong, as could be expected, among
supporters of far-left parties (KKE, Syriza). The perception of the effectiveness of protest
also plays a role.
Controlling for opposition to the austerity programme, what determines support for
protest against the policy? Again, relative deprivation variables are associated with
protest potential. Apart from supporters of far-left parties and rational choice variables,
some aspects of biographical availability and political resources also play a part. Potential
protesters are younger, less likely to have been to university and less likely to be members
of political parties. Interestingly, previous protest involvement does not influence protest
potential.
Place of residence is the most important predictor of perceived protest opportunity.
Respondents in big cities are considerably more likely to perceive an opportunity to
protest than rural residents. Previous protest involvement also makes it more likely that
respondents perceive protest opportunities, as is a perception that demonstrations are an
effective form of political action. Otherwise, relative deprivation, biographical availability
and ideology play no role.
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TABLE 3 Determinants of Opposition to Austerity, Protest Potential and Perceived
Protest Opportunity
Opposition to
austerity
programme
Potential protesters
(people should
protest)
Perceived
protest
opportunity
(1) (2) (3)
Controls
Opposed to austerity programme – 0.500 (0.060)*** 20.044 (0.066)
People should protest – agree – – 20.131 (0.073)
Place of residence (Reference: farm or village) – –
Small town, suburb 0.331 (0.218)
Big city 1.706 (0.215)***
Relative deprivation
Personal financial situation (compared to a
year ago) – worse
0.399 (0.086)*** 0.190 (0.078)* 0.037 (0.091)
Economic expectations (next 12 months) –
worse
0.488 (0.065)*** 0.218 (0.066)** 20.056 (0.075)
Blame – each and everyone of use – not at all
responsible
0.470 (0.225)* 0.461 (0.241) 20.190 (0.241)
Burden not fairly distributed – agree 0.063 (0.072) 0.237 (0.068)*** 20.012 (0.070)
Biographical availability
Age (older) 20.002 (0.005) 20.022 (0.005)*** 20.008 (0.006)
Male 0.067 (0.133) 20.165 (0.135) 0.045 (0.150)
Married or living with partner 20.099 (0.194) 0.129 (0.200) 0.012 (0.221)
Children 20.141 (0.217) 0.153 (0.241) 20.179 (0.235)
Education (university) 20.173 (0.136) 20.333 (0.139)* 0.115 (0.166)
Networks
In full-time employment 0.197 (0.151) 20.286 (0.146) 20.296 (0.166)
Public sector 0.006 (0.162) 20.126 (0.155) 20.323 (0.169)
Member of political party 0.117 (0.246) 20.474 (0.232)* 0.450 (0.258)
Member of trade union 0.302 (0.258) 0.215 (0.228) 0.510 (0.290)
Member of voluntary association 20.032 (0.166) 20.205 (0.167) 0.048 (0.196)
Previous participation in demonstrations
(Reference: never)
Once 0.379 (0.371) 20.313 (0.376) 0.272 (0.433)
2–5 times 20.301 (0.191) 0.071 (0.216) 0.560 (0.252)*
More than 5 times 0.356 (0.280) 0.314 (0.272) 0.472 (0.339)
Previous participation in strikes (Reference:
never)
Once 20.095 (0.326) 0.327 (0.354) 0.889 (0.432)*
2–5 times 20.108 (0.227) 0.340 (0.244) 0.179 (0.263)
More than 5 times 0.034 (0.248) 0.309 (0.247) 0.690 (0.265)**
Political ideology
Left wing (left-right scale) 20.071 (0.154) 20.081 (0.150) 0.142 (0.160)
Voted for party left of PASOK in 2009 1.061 (0.224)*** 0.551 (0.235)* 20.211 (0.248)
Postmaterialism 0.031 (0.070) 0.132 (0.069) 20.099 (0.074)
Rational choice
Effectiveness of participating in
demonstrations (high)
0.162 (0.071)* 0.275 (0.075)*** 0.156 (0.073)*
Effectiveness of participating in strikes (high) 0.140 (0.073) 0.144 (0.069)* 20.060 (0.075)
Cost of taking part in a demonstration (low) 20.032 (0.055) 20.013 (0.058) 0.051 (0.057)
Log pseudolikelihood 21200.217 21082.124 2762.041
McKelvie and Zavoina’s
Pseudo-r2 0.254 0.381 0.245
AIC 2,460.435 2,226.248 1,588.082
BIC 2,604.104 2,374.706 1,741.329
N 888 888 888
Note: cell entries are ordered logit regression coefficients, robust standard errors in brackets, statistically
significant coefficients in bold. *p, 0.05, **p, 0.01, ***p, 0.001. AIC: Aikaike’s Information Criterion; BIC:
Bayesian Information Criterion (both AIC and BIC are reported in the version as ‘used by Stata’, cf. Long and
Freese 2006, 110–13.
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Turning to the main question of who protested against austerity in 2010, the role of
previous protest involvement is clearly of central importance. More than four out of five
protesters had participated in protest during the previous ten years. The first part of our
analysis of actual protest behaviour is thus comparing the determinants of 2010 protest
involvement with protest in previous years. Relative deprivation variables, for which we
do not have historical data, and control variables that are only relevant to the austerity
movement are omitted from this analysis (see Table 4).
The analysis of previous protest involvement (Column 1) confirms most of the classical
hypotheses about protest involvement: protesters are found to be younger, male, highly
educated, working in the public sector, members of trade unions and/or voluntary
associations, with a left-wing ideology and post-materialist values, and with high
perceptions of the effectiveness of protest and a low perception of the costs. Remarkably,
the analysis of 2010 protest (Column 2) fits the same model rather well, with only a few
exceptions: 2010 protesters are not as predominantly male, are married or living with a
partner, and are in full-time employment. These results strongly suggest that protest in
2010 was essentially a continuation of previous protest trends rather than a radical break
from the country’s history of contentious politics.
How do these predictors of protest participation stand up if we control for the specific
features of anti-austerity protest – namely opposition to austerity policies, support for
protest against these policies and the perceived opportunities to join a protest? To what
extent does the predictive power of relative deprivation also contribute to the explanation
of how potential is turned into actual protest? The results of the analysis shown in
Column 3 (Model 2) demonstrate quite clearly that relative deprivation is not a factor that
mobilizes people to take part in actual protest. Otherwise, the coefficients of Model 2 are
remarkably similar to those in Model 1, not including the control variables. While the
effect of trade union membership is not statistically significant in this model, a separate
analysis of strike participation (details not shown) suggests that this variable and full-time
employment are important predictors in the public sector. Looking at the relative
importance of different types of predictors (details not shown), network involvement and
political ideology have the highest impact on protest participation, followed by rational
choice. The effect of biographical availability is very small by comparison.63 Overall, this
model of 2010 protest participation confirms the earlier analysis that the significant
individual-level predictors of anti-austerity protest, with some minor exceptions, fit the
pattern of variables responsible for previous protests.
Moving on to our final analysis (Column 4), which adds previous protest experience to
our model, we seek to answer two additional questions. First, how important is previous
protest participation once we control for opposition to austerity policy, protest potential
and protest opportunity, as well as all other individual-level predictors of protest, ranging
from relative deprivation to resources and biographical availability, political ideology and
rational choice? Secondly, once we control for previous protest participation, which of
our variables explains the new mobilization process?
Dealing with the second question first, we have already seen in the analysis in Column 1
that biographical availability, network involvement, political ideology and rational
63 This assessment is based on the comparison of AIC (Akaike’s Information Criterion) and BIC
(Bayesian Information Criterion) statistics for various models in which the relative quality of models
including relative deprivation, biographical availability, network involvement, political ideology and
rational choice variables, is compared.
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TABLE 4 Determinants of Protest Against Austerity Policy
Actual protest participation (2010)
Previous protest
Strikes and/or demonstrations
involvement Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Demonstrations Strikes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Controls
Opposition to austerity programme – 20.012 (0.079) 0.006 (0.088) 20.236 (0.093) 20.017 (0.105)
Protest potential – 0.439 (0.099)** 0.403 (0.107)*** 0.356 (0.112)** 0.526 (0.137)***
Perceived protest opportunity – 1.068 (0.138)*** 0.979 (0.153)*** 0.866 (0.171)*** 2.048 (0.226)***
Relative deprivation
Personal financial situation (compared to a year
ago) – worse
– 20.016 (0.117) 20.103 (0.121) 20.078 (0.139) 0.145 (0.158)
Economic expectations (next 12 months) – worse – 0.063 (0.102) 0.084 (0.110) 0.082 (0.125) 0.149 (0.133)
Blame – each and everyone of use – not at all
responsible
0.411 (0.261) 0.382 (0.272) 0.484 (0.290) 0.096 (0.304)
Burden not fairly distributed – agree – 0.023 (0.086) 0.028 (0.087) 0.007 (0.094) 20.122 (0.104)
Biographical availability
Age (older) 20.022 (0.006)*** 20.021 (0.007)** 20.016 (0.007)* 20.011 (0.009) 0.001 (0.009) 20.015 (0.011)
Male 0.483 (0.163)** 0.223 (0.173) 0.251 (0.188) 20.061 (0.213) 0.281 (0.224) 20.496 (0.247)*
Married or living with partner 20.006 (0.256) 0.644 (0.280)* 0.771 (0.283)** 0.803 (0.296)** 0.689 (0.341)* 1.003 (0.365)**
Children 0.221 (0.291) 20.445 (0.302) 20.565 (0.313) 20.834 (0.332)* 20.649 (0.385) 20.878 (0.408)*
Education (university) 0.441 (0.170)* 0.129 (0.184) 0.127 (0.210) 0.073 (0.229) 0.038 (0.243) 0.189 (0.281)
Networks
In full-time employment 0.325 (0.175) 0.687 (0.183)*** 0.884 (0.210)*** 0.622 (0.237)** 0.052 (0.254) 1.196 (0.276)***
Public sector 0.625 (0.179)*** 0.479 (0.194)* 0.597 (0.211)** 0.399 (0.238) 0.144 (0.260) 0.483 (0.268)
Member of political party 0.081 (0.286) 0.515 (0.278) 0.420 (0.299) 0.308 (0.340) 0.442 (0.358) 0.007 (0.384)
Member of trade union 1.265 (0.306)*** 0.609 (0.299)* 0.416 (0.337) 0.076 (0.395) 0.426 (0.362) 0.539 (0.445)
Member of voluntary association 0.535 (0.208)* 0.468 (0.222)* 0.553 (0.239)* 0.310 (0.267) 0.086 (0.289) 0.480 (0.305)
Previous participation in demonstrations
(Reference: No)
Once 0.726 (0.455) 1.403 (0.517)** 0.089 (0.541)
2–5 times 0.942 (0.280)** 1.446 (0.284)*** 0.115 (0.368)
More than 5 times – 2.005 (0.431)*** 2.261 (0.401)*** 0.881 (0.403)*
Previous participation in strikes (Reference: No)
Once 1.476 (0.414)*** 1.089 (0.456)* 2.161 (0.476)***
2–5 times 1.472 (0.319)*** 0.820 (0.348)* 2.011 (0.390)***
More than 5 times – 1.174 (0.347)** 20.078 (0.378) 2.146 (0.376)***
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TABLE 4 (Continued)
Political ideology
Left wing (left-right scale) 0.403 (0.168)* 0.607 (0.179)** 0.531 (0.204)** 0.403 (0.236) 0.371 (0.238) 0.005 (0.283)
Voted for party left of PASOK in 2009 0.985 (0.307)** 0.389 (0.303) 0.241 (0.331) 20.096 (0.353) 20.102 (0.316) 0.349 (0.438)
Postmaterialism 0.160 (0.080)* 0.189 (0.086)* 0.241 (0.098)* 0.140 (0.110) 0.181 (0.117) 0.080 (0.134)
Rational choice
Effectiveness of participating in demonstrations
(high)
0.232 (0.076)** 0.382 (0.085)*** 0.275 (0.090)** 0.282 (0.103)** 0.302 (0.120)* 0.020 (0.118)
Effectiveness of participating in strikes (high) 0.268 (0.077)*** 0.147 (0.085) 0.104 (0.090) 20.079 (0.108) 20.001 (0.124) 0.062 (0.117)
Cost of taking part in a demonstration (low) 0.147 (0.064)* 0.227 (0.069)** 0.229 (0.072)** 0.180 (0.083)* 0.102 (0.086) 0.281 (0.098)**
Constant 22.609 (0.396)*** 23.456 (0.505)*** 26.895 (0.860)*** 26.190 (0.897)*** 26.757 (0.971)*** 29.687 (1.234)***
Log pseudolikelihood 2501.572 2452.593 2386.196 2328.104 2302.903 2242.102
McKelvie and Zavoina’s Pseudo-r2 0.343 0.332 0.491 0.578 0.532 0.709
AIC 1,037.145 939.185 820.393 716.208 665.806 544.204
BIC 1,119.398 1,021.547 935.489 859.877 809.475 687.873
N 933 939 894 888 888 888
Note: cell entries are binary logit regression coefficients, robust standard errors in brackets, statistically significant coefficients in bold.
*p, 0.05, **p, 0.01, ***p, 0.001. AIC: Aikaike’s Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion.
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choice variables are all independent predictors of previous protest involvement. This
analysis confirms most of the standard theories of protest mobilization. But do the same
factors also play a role in mobilizing new protests? Here the results throw up a few
unexpected findings.
Age does not quite have the anticipated effect. Younger people are slightly more likely
to engage in protest, but once previous protest is controlled for, the co-efficient is no
longer statistically significant. This finding contradicts not only our theoretical
expectations but also many of the journalistic accounts that often focus centrally on
the role of youth culture and the internet as key elements of a new generation of protest.64
Our results challenge these accounts. The Greek protesters of 2010 are not particularly
young: their average age is only marginally lower than the national average; the age group
with the highest share of both strikers and demonstrators consists of those between forty-
five and fifty-four years – 48 per cent of this age group went on strike and 43 per cent
attended a local demonstration. Even among those over sixty-five, involvement in protest
is still strong, with 20 per cent attending demonstrations; the oldest demonstrator in the
sample is eighty-eight years old. Therefore, unlike the social unrest of December 2008,65
mass protest against the austerity measures in 2010 was not the preserve of the young but
involves people of all ages, particularly the middle-aged.
Similarly, gender is not as important as could be expected for new mobilizations, and
married people are slightly more likely to engage in strikes and demonstrations, while
having children discourages people from taking part in protest. Individuals in full-time
employment were more likely to be mobilized in 2010. Otherwise, education, membership
of trade unions and voluntary associations, and political ideology are not significantly
associated with the mobilization of anti-austerity protest once we control for past protest
involvement. These results show that while factors such as age (youth), gender (male),
education, public sector employment, membership of trade unions and voluntary
organizations, left-wing ideology and postmaterialism have an indirect effect on 2010
protest behaviour through past protest experience, they do not have a direct effect once
past protest involvement is controlled for.
The analysis presented in this model combines a number of different processes and types of
protest. What factors determine whether ‘veteran’ protesters are re-mobilized in 2010 or not?
What accounts for the recruitment of novice protesters? Are the effects different for strikes
and demonstrations? We conducted analyses of all these separate mobilization processes; the
main differences we found are between strikers and demonstrators, and separate models are
presented for each form of protest in Columns 5 and 6.
Age is not a relevant variable in these more detailed analyses. However, gender features
surprisingly strongly for participation in strikes, and a comparison of new and veteran
strikers (details not shown) suggests that women are particularly noticeable among new
recruits in strike action. Being married or living with a partner is positively associated
with both striking and demonstrating. This variable is very strongly associated with the
mobilization of veteran protesters (details not shown). Having children is negatively
associated with protest participation, in particular for strike action. Being in full-time
employment is a strong predictor of mobilization for strikes (for both new and veteran
strikers). Finally, neither trade union membership nor left-wing ideology plays a role for
64 See, for example, Mason 2012.
65 Pechtelidis 2011.
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either strikers or demonstrators, with the sole exception of trade union membership as a
statistically significant predictor of new strike recruits.
What are we to make of these results? Some of these detailed findings may be the product
of the specific mobilization context experienced in 2010. The violence associated with protest
in 2008 as well as 2010 may have made parents more conscious of the risks involved; the
extreme nature of the austerity measures could have motivated people not previously
associated with protest to become active. Overall, the main thrust of these results appears to
support the notion that people faced with extreme economic hardship may become mobilized,
contrary to expectations on the impact of biographical availability factors.66
This leaves us with what clearly is the most important group of predictors: previous
protest involvement. With 80 per cent of protesters having taken part at least once in
either strikes or demonstrations before, this is perhaps not surprising. Looking at the role
of the frequency of previous protest involvement provides an additional perspective. In
Model 3 (Table 4, Column 4), we find that the more often respondents had taken part in
demonstrations before, the more likely they were to become involved in anti-austerity
protest in 2010.
The strength of the predictive power of previous protest involvement is underlined even
further once we combine the frequency of taking part in demonstrations and strikes. This
analysis (details not shown) suggests that those who have been involved in both strikes
and demonstrations multiple times before are the most likely to take part in anti-austerity
protest. Those who have either taken part in both strikes and demonstrations more than
five times over the last ten years, or who have taken part more than five times in one and
at least two to five times in the other, are considerably more likely to take part in protest
in 2010. Keeping all other variables constant (at their mean), the predicted probability of
protest participation was calculated in relation to previous protest experience, combining
the frequency of participation in strikes and demonstrations on a scale of 0 to 6. The
result displayed in Figure 3 shows emphatically that protest participation in 2010 is, to a
large extent, a function of the degree of previous protest involvement.
DISCUSSION
What does our analysis of the Greek case tell us about the drivers of political protest in
general, and the anti-austerity movement in particular? A key finding is that different
variables matter at different stages of the process: the drivers change as our focus shifts
from explaining opposition to austerity to protest potential and, ultimately, actual protest
participation.
Starting with the influence of economic deprivation and feelings of injustice, our results
show that these are significant predictors of opposition to austerity policies and support
for protest. However, relative deprivation does not predict turning potential into actual
participation. The second group of variables associated with resources (biographical
availability and network involvement) performs somewhat better in explaining actual
protest. In line with the main tenets of civic voluntarism, people protest if they have the
resources and the opportunity to do so. However, against expectations, some key
variables, not least education, do not play the expected role in the Greek case. Yet this, in
combination with other factors, characterizes the type of protest quite well. This is not a
protest movement of a middle-class educational elite that is active in their spare time, as
66 Cf. Corrigall-Brown et al. 2009.
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most ‘new social movements’ in Western Europe have been in recent decades. This is a
mass protest in which ordinary people of all educational backgrounds and ages take part.
It is also those in full-time employment who are most likely to be involved in both strikes
and demonstrations, and this variable remains an independent predictor when previous
protest is controlled for. In other words, those involved most closely in economic life,
rather than people on the margins or outside of the labour force, are the main carriers of
this protest movement.
The traditional network of trade union and voluntary group membership, as well as
public sector employment, play a key role in recruiting protesters. However, these exert
their influence through past protest experience; none of these network factors is an
independent predictor of protest, once past protest is controlled for. The same applies to
political ideology variables (left-wing ideology and postmaterialism), which are both
significant predictors of past and present protest but are not independent predictors of
anti-austerity protest, once past protest experience is taken into account.
The dominance of the role of past protest engagement should caution us to interpret
this result in terms of the marginality of the involvement in social networks as a predictor
of protest participation. It is beyond doubt that anti-austerity protest involves, to a large
extent, mobilizing an existing pool of experienced strikers and demonstrators. The share of
those with no previous participation is fairly small. There are hints that there are some new
aspects in 2010, for example the role of women among strikers, but the drivers of first-time
mobilization is a separate question altogether, which requires further elaboration.67
Finally, one of the most intriguing findings is that the rational choice variables are
found to play a role at all stages of the protest recruitment process. A high evaluation of
the effectiveness of protest, in particular demonstrations, is an independent predictor
of opposition to austerity, protest potential and perception of protest opportunity.
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Fig. 3. Predicted probability of protest participation in 2010 in relation to previous protest participation
67 This question is explored in greater detail in Ru¨dig and Karyotis 2013.
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Moreover, rational choice variables are also independent predictors of not only past but
also actual protest in 2010, even when controlling for protest potential and the degree of
past protest experience. Despite the inherent limitations of interpreting the results of a
one-time survey, their robustness across the board suggests that rational choice
considerations should be taken seriously in any model of protest behaviour.
CONCLUSION
Anti-austerity protest in Greece constitutes a mass movement; our survey found that
about 30 per cent of the entire population engaged in some type of protest in 2010. The
analysis of the profile of protesters demonstrates that protest was not the preserve of
those with a high socio-economic status, high levels of education or lots of time on their
hands. Nor was it primarily students, political extremists or dropouts who were involved
in the actions. Protesters mainly came from the political left, but otherwise, it was the
average Greek who took part, those in full-time employment, married, not particularly
young or old, or highly educated. In other words, the protests came from the heart of
society and lacked the ‘new social movement’ characteristics emphasized by the literature
on protest of recent decades. Howard Kerbo’s distinction between ‘movements of affluence’
and ‘movements of crisis’ offers a useful way to capture these differences – anti-austerity
protest clearly falls in the latter category.
Protest against austerity also has a feeling of ‘old’ politics about it that may be
reminiscent of the strike movements of previous decades. With four out of five
participants having taken part in protest before, it is evident that many of the usual
suspects were re-mobilized; that is, employed people who are trade union members and have
left-wing political views. Still, protest in Greece is historically not limited to followers of Far
Left parties. Once the influence of previous protest participation was accounted for, ideology
does not play that much of a role, indicating that the high degree of mobilization of veteran
and new protesters in 2010 was not limited to left-wing activists.
A more plausible explanation is that the usual suspects in Greece, through their
organizational infrastructure, act as first movers in the generation of protest
opportunities, who trigger the latent protest socialization of a broader public that is
not strongly defined ideologically in left-right terms. This may also have some
implications for the phenomenal rise in support for parties of the left, particularly
Syriza, in the double elections of 2012. Their electoral success may partly be attributed to
their ability to attract opponents of the austerity policy who are not necessarily
radicalized in terms of ideology. If this holds true, the future electoral behaviour of these
voters is likely to be in flux and largely defined by how the debt crisis develops and how it
is managed by the governing coalition. Nevertheless, the medium- to long-term political
impact of the anti-austerity movement remains completely open and cannot be
established with a one-time survey alone or without panel data.
Based on these findings, there are two main theoretical and comparative implications
for austerity politics that are of broader relevance beyond the Greek case. First, the
factors that predict protest potential are not a good measure of who actually takes part in
protest. High levels of deprivation can convince large sections of the population to
embrace the idea of protest against government policy. However, while deprivation
increases the potential for austerity protest, it is not an independent predictor of actual
protest. The probability of significant anti-austerity protest movements thus depends on
other contextual factors.
Mass Opposition to Austerity in Greece 509
Secondly, the most significant implication for other countries is that previous protest
participation, on its own, constitutes an important recruiting pool for actual protest.
People are recruited into strikes and demonstrations through a process of socialization
into taking particular forms of political action. Therefore we should expect that the
potential for protest in the wake of austerity measures will depend notably on the extent
to which people have been engaged in prior protest. In countries where there is a strong,
established protest culture, where a significant minority regularly engages in such
activities, it should be easier for protest potential to be transformed into actual protest
participation. This would suggest that anti-austerity movements might struggle to reach
high levels of mobilization in countries such as Ireland, the UK and Portugal, but are
likely to have a broader appeal in Italy and Spain.
We obviously have to be careful in formulating conclusions about cross-national
differences in protest behaviour on the basis of individual-level data analysis. Taking into
account both the drivers of mobilization at the individual level and the aggregate context
at the national level offers the most promising avenue for developing our understanding
of protest behaviour. The analysis in this article clearly demonstrates the central role of
the Greek protest culture and its dynamic interrelationship with individual drivers in
producing anti-austerity protest. Future cross-national comparative research is necessary
to take account of other contextual variables, such as the relative power of parliament,68
in explaining the emergence and development of anti-austerity movements.
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